Tuesday, December 11, 2012

On The Dangers of Mistrust of Authority


If one were to observe charts and graphs about Guatemala’s economy, without visiting the nation or surveying its people, they could be convinced that Libertarians are absolutely right.  Each year from 1960 to 2006 Guatemala lowered tax-rates, unemployment was below three percent and their government is was not indebted to even one other country. What that observer cannot learn from charts and graphs though, is that those employed people were uneducated, underpaid,   starving, and often without clean water. The saddest part is, the citizens of Guatemala had the opportunity change their circumstances, and chose not to do so. They are terrified of giving any of their personal revenue to the government.      
In 1999, the Consulta Popular bill (C.P.), which would give indigenous (namely, Mayan) Guatemalans equal social and political rights, was voted down almost as quickly as the tax reforms, which would allow the government to provide citizens with clean water and decent roads, were three years earlier. As a result, Guatemala has the lowest tax rates of any established democracy and those  who are in charge today struggle to provide people with their most basic rights.  (Blake, 2008)
The aforementioned CP was not just rejected by European Guatemalans, but by the Mayans themselves.  Most readers will find this counter-intuitive  but neither group has any trust in authority.  The European Guatemalans were afraid of loss of power, and the Mayans were insulted by the proposal. Though it guaranteed them the right to vote, and buy or own property, it did nothing to stop the discrimination that occurred in the private-sector, or in schools and did not impose a law that would force businesses to pay all employees equally, regardless of race. The Mayans had fought too fiercely to accept less than they deserved. (Carey, 2004)
Though it has long been run democratically, for years the Guatemalan government was simply too big. Not only was it controlling but there were also only one group with any power. The CACIF was a political party similar to the communist party, but was led by the owners of two corporations, who catered to their own.   Like many corrupt governments, they owed their power to the wealthy elite, and so, like many corrupt governments, they ignored the poor.  A result, in 1944, the "October Revolutionaries", and their leader, Juan Arbez staged a coup, and overthrew the oligarchy, or organizationally-run government. They established liberal economic policies, which benefited   and greatly strengthened the civil and labor rights of the urban working class and the peasants.  This movement seems like an occurrence the United States would celebrate. During the 1950’s, however the US was right in the middle of what is now referred to as The Red Scare and anything that resembled communism was thought to be evil.  The U.S. government ordered Central Intelligence to stop what they called, Guatemala’s “communist revolt", and placed unbelievably strict sanctions on Guatemala, and even stopped funding American fruit companies that were growing their products in Guatemala. The United States’ extreme action was a major component in Guatemalans mistrust of their leaders because it led to a wider division between the underprivileged Mayans, and wealthy citizens of a European decent.   Unlike in many minorities in other countries, the Mayans, who are very obviously discriminated, against were and are almost forty-seven percent of the ­population.  The majority of this group was sick and tired of being ignored. They staged uprising that led to a bloody civil-war that lasted thirty-six years, from 1960-1996.
As was stated earlier, the year the war ended a tax reform, which would only raise taxes by four and a half percent, was proposed and voted down.  Because there were no checks and balances in place, all Guatemalans were fearful of returning to the oligarchy that was in place before 1944, and refused to give the government the chance to do so. Why did the elite fear the kind of government that had made their lives so easy? They had seen what is possible when running one’s own business, and wanted that ability.
Fortunately, in 2003, a PAN candidate, Oscar Berger was elected. Berger is a moderate, who was able to win the support of European Guatemalans by promising to enforce a US-like market reform, and won the Mayan vote by promising a stronger equal rights bill. In 2006, that bill was passed, and so were the exact tax reforms proposed at the end of the Civil War in 1996.
Berger’s willingness to pass these bills and the citizens’ willingness to trust him are certainly a turn for the better. Enforcing these laws however, has proven to be very difficult. No equivalent the Internal Revenue Service exists in Guatemala and tax evasion has become a major problem.  Racism still is rampant, and deep. European Guatemalans make excuses not hire Mayans, despite the fact that the discrimination is technically illegal. Both issues, according to outside economist and sociologists, are predicted to be issues for a long time.   
It appears that European Guatemalans are currently in a situation similar the one that the Caucasian Americans were during the Civil-Rights, and Women’s Liberation movements of the 1960s. They may not like the government is asking them to open their minds, and are attempting to find ways to keep them closed. The U.S. has not come far enough since the sixties, but we have made remarkable progress. Every generation has become more and more tolerant, and the laws put in place to protect African-Americans and women were certainly a huge part of that. I believe the same can and will happen for Mayans in Guatemalan. That is why I agree with the statement, “the evolution of tax policy and indigenous rights show that, slowly but surely, democracy is improving the lives of all Guatemalans.”     



Works Cited
Blake, C. (2008). Politics of latin america. (2nd ed., pp. 298-318). New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Carey, D. (2004). The struggle continues: Consciousness, social movement, and class action,. Latin american Prospective. , 31(6), 69-95. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4141608



    

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